Frederik sopen biography of barack obama

Administration of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 2022

December 31, 2022

The following list includes the President's public schedule and other items of general interest announced by the Office of the Press Secretary and not included elsewhere in this Compilation.

January 1

In the afternoon, the President traveled to Wilmington, DE, where he attended Mass at Saint Ann Parish. Later, he traveled to Greenville, DE, where, at his residence, he remained overnight.

January 2

During the day, from his residence in Greenville, DE, the President had a telephone conversation with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine to make it clear that the U.S. and its allies and partners would respond decisively if Russia further invaded Ukraine, express support for diplomatic efforts, starting next week with the bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue, at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through the NATO-Russia Council, and at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, reaffirm the U.S. commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and emphasize his support for confidence-building measures to deescalate tensions in Donbas and active diplomacy to advance the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, in support of the Normandy Format.

The White House announced that the President will return to Washington, DC, on January 3.

January 3

In the morning, the President returned to Washington, DC. Later, in the Oval Office, he and Vice President Kamala D. Harris had an intelligence briefing.

January 4

In the morning, in the Oval Office, the President and Vice President Kamala D. Harris had an intelligence briefing.

January 5

In the morning, in the Oval Office, the President and Vice President Kamala D. Harris had an intelligence briefing.

The White House announced that the President and Dr. Biden will travel to Boulder, CO, and Las Vegas, NV, on January 7.

The White House announced that the Presid

In February 2023, the Biden administration released its Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy. The new CAT policy was a long time coming, but whether it was worth the wait and will substantively shape US arms transfers is a matter of debate. On the campaign trail, Biden had made numerous statements about better controlling US arms sales to recipients who were engaged in conflict and human rights violations in particular. Once in office, he placed some controversial pending sales under review, even while promoting others and overseeing a general increase in the volume and value of approved US arms transfers. But a coherent statement of the administration’s policies and priorities for US conventional arms transfers has taken more than two years into Biden’s term to arrive. Undoubtedly, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the unprecedented uptick in demand it has placed on US conventional arms supplies has complicated matters. Even so, US presidents have long attempted to balance incentives to promote US conventional arms abroad with incentives to restrict them. The essays in this roundtable address the innovations of Biden’s CAT policy while also voicing some skepticism that it will significantly change US arms transfers in practice.

H-Diplo | Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum

Policy Roundtable II-2

Biden’s Conventional Arms Transfer Policy

June 2023 |PDF: https://issforum.org/to/jprII-2 | Website: rjissf.org

Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Jennifer L. Erickson | Production Editor: Christopher Ball

Contents

Introduction by Jennifer L. Erickson, Boston College. 2

Esasy by Jonathan D. Caverley, U.S. Naval War College. 5

Essay by Jordan Cohen, CATO Institute. 12

Essay by Hoshik Nam, University of Iowa. 18

Essay by Jennifer Spindel, University of New Hampshire. 24

Introduction by Jennifer L. Erickson, Boston College

In February 2023, the Biden administration released its Conventional Arms Tr

Introduction

What role should arms sales play in American foreign policy? Though major deals — like Trump’s $110 billion agreement with Saudi Arabia announced in 2017 or the decision to sell arms to Ukraine — provoke brief periods of discussion, there is no real debate in Washington about the wisdom of exporting vast quantities of weapons around the globe to allies and nonallies alike. Congress, which has the authority to cancel arms deals, has not impeded a deal since the passage of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act created the framework for doing so. Since 9/11 the pace of sales has increased. From 2002 to 2016, the United States sold roughly $197 billion worth of weapons and related military support to 167 countries. In just his first year Donald Trump cut a deal worth as much as $110 billion to Saudi Arabia alone and notified Congress of 157 sales worth more than $84 billion to 42 other nations. Despite losing market share over the past two decades because of increasing competition, the United States still enjoyed the largest share of the global arms trade between 2012 and 2016 at 33 percent.

The current consensus in favor of arms sales rests on three planks. First, advocates argue that arms sales enhance American security by bolstering the military capabilities of allies, enabling them to deter and contain their adversaries, and helping promote stability in critical areas like the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Second, they argue that arms sales help the United States exert influence over the behavior and foreign policies of client nations. Finally, advocates argue that arms sales provide a boon to the U.S. economy and fiscal benefits in the form of lower unit costs to the Pentagon, while helping ensure the health of the American defense industrial base.

We argue, however, that Washington’s faith in the wisdom of foreign arms sales is seriously misplaced. The benefits tend to be